Simulated Hostile Encounter (Atlantis)

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Simulated Hostile Encounter AAR
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“The quest for truth is a noble one.”

-Anonymous


Overview

On Stardate 239704.12 the crew of the USS Atlantis were subjected to an intensely complex combat simulation to test her respective departments. The crew would have their performance monitored closely in order to devise effective improvement strategies. For several departments, new chiefs and personnel had recently been appointed, and had as yet not undergone any formal drills or examinations. Not only this, but new routines for various tactical and security implementations had been devised, and required field testing.

Departments were not informed about many aspects of the exercise, in an attempt to keep reactions as close to actual combat conditions as possible. As such, the ship was outfitted from stem to stern with holoprojectors to simulate hostile boarding action, while asteroids within the Paldor Asteroid Field were equipped with sensor bluffs to have them appear as hostile ships.


Goals and Objectives

While the initial objective was to run an “Abandon Ship” drill, the scope of the project was quickly scaled to test a wider variety of crew readiness situations. These included:

  1. Testing new security enhancements/procedures.
  2. Reviewing hostile boarding procedure and testing crew responsiveness in such situations.
  3. Monitoring crew response times during evacuation & abandon ship orders.
  4. Gain an insight into the crew’s ability to think and respond appropriately during a developing situation.



Click sub-headings below to expand or collapse.

Command Report



Tactical Report - David Knight


Analysis

(All thoughts are IC only)

The simulation was successful in the context of the published objectives. From the Tactical perspective of the situation the entire endeavor was meant to test the ships weapons systems and my ability to employ said weapons systems. While the Atlantis sustained multiple hits and moderate damage three enemy vessels were registered as destroyed or damaged beyond repair. A fourth known to have cloaking capabilities was disabled using a prototype cloak detecting system developed by the current first officer, Commander Serala.

The program in question appears to be functional in concept, however I find it to not be practical as it currently relies on the use of torpedoes to locate cloaked vessels through proximity detonation. The Atlantis currently carries 40 Type II photon torpedoes, 10 Type VI quantum torpedoes at maximum capacity. The resupply and restocking of these weapons is difficult within the Expanse and I would not recommend the use of the current prototype system. The concept behind the idea Is sound, and I believe it could be employed using modified sensor probes instead.

Weapons systems proved effective within reason when engaging simulated enemy vessels that employed the proven tactic of wolf pack hunting. I was able to destroy two vessels with concentrated phaser fire and another using torpedoes with a sensor probe to aid in targeting solution. The fourth was disabled using the method described above. Shields and deflectors were raised in time to stop as much enemy fire as possible. The shields sustained repeated fire but never dropped below fifty percent. Shield and deflection rate can however be improved with an update systems overhaul at DS26 with commanding officer of the Atlantis approval.

Recommendations

From my end of things I believe the intentions of the simulation were in the right place, however I strongly disagree with its execution. Myself along with other crew members were injured, real damage was incurred on the ship, and the simulation used methods not realistic.

The injury of myself and other crew members was an unnecessary occurrence that could have been avoided. Having said that however I recognize that injuries can and do occur, and the fact that some of these injuries could not have been avoided. I would also like to state that I hold no ill will because of this incident.

Non simulated damage on the Atlantis occurred on the bridge during the beginning of the simulation when a fire broke out before It was quickly suppressed.

As the ships Tactical officer I feel the deployment of a simulated boarding pods was implemented unfairly. The boarding pod in question materialized within the shield perimeter. Shields were well within strength standards to have the ability to have stopped physical objects from reaching the Atlantis.

Having said all this I want to state for the record that these recommendations were made with as little bias as possible and that the exercise demonstrated exceptional ingenuity. The simulation met all goals and was very effective at simulating real world conditions. Methods employed within given time constraints demonstrated the effectiveness of Atlantis crew member Kiax

Operations Report - Esa Kiax


Analysis

In the event of Hostile Spacecraft encounters, the defined role of Operations staff is not always immediately obvious. While many of our personnel are cross trained between security or engineering disciplines, perhaps the suddenness of combat situations evolving and changing caused them to become flustered and lose focus, especially amongst the lower ranks. Several new members of the department lacked direction for much of the simulation, which didn’t contribute to overall departmental efficiency. Cross trained personnel help to bolster departments are essential, where and when necessary, so it is important to ensure appropriate training is administered when possible.

That said, during situations where the ship has sustained significant damage, the need for dedicated operations staff who are able to take on the role of Damage Control - that is, controlling the effects of damage already sustained throughout the ship, as opposed to repairing it - is of paramount importance. It is through the action of said Damage Control experts that any impairment of the ship, or it’s systems, does not get worse until an engineering team can move in and replace or repair the component/area in question.

As a department, Operations did exceptionally well to maintain a high level of efficiency for tasks they were assigned, from ensuring areas of the ship were adequately maintained to shuttlecraft preparation, though their relative successes were not without certain difficulties. For example, there were a number of instances where crew members on the Damage Control teams were forced to a halt when barred by forcefields, or could not erect necessary forcefields. This was, in part, due to power constraints on the ship, but also due to existing security fields that were in place, that many of the lower ranked members of the department lacked the clearance to deactivate. While it is recognised that the security protocols that erect the forcefields are a necessity during a hostile boarding action, in a time critical nature such as this, they not only slowed down the response time, they actually caused a number of additional problems, with crew members actively looking for higher ranked personnel, or security officers in order to deactivate the forcefields in their path, which put a number of them in direct lines of fire between ship personnel and hostile intruders.

From a holistic point of view, the tasks afforded to the Operations department were met with vigour and readiness, with only a few small areas needing significant improvement. This is not to say that everything that happened was perfect. Critical Systems were not always fully staffed, the aforementioned directive issues caused serious problems and a chance death reduced the effectiveness of damage control teams in the latter part of the simulation.

In summary, while the department operated within reasonable margins of error and to an acceptable degree of success, improvements can and will be made in light of this.

Recommendations

In response to the points presented above, several recommendations are being put forward in an attempt to maximise operational efficiency while maintaining departmental autonomy and flexibility.

The first of which is an immediate mandate for heightened cross training, especially those in Security related disciplines. When a hostile force boards the ship, it is imperative that security responds quickly and efficiently, and as a result, having personnel from other departments come in as additional bodies can sometimes be detrimental. An increase in security drills specifically for these members of the crew would be of great assistance, but also the opportunity to run training sessions with other members of the security department to increase unit cohesion and effectiveness would make a great deal of difference.

Secondly, regarding Security’s excessive use of forcefields. It is the opinion of this report that, while effective at slowing the rate of intrusion, there were simply too many forcefields in place, many of which were situated on decks that saw no hostile incursion. A solution to this would present itself in the form of using the internal sensor grid to apply the forcefields to sections, instead of decks, and only on the decks where a hostile presence has been detected. That way, the majority of the crew without higher levels of security clearance can still move around the ship, performing critical tasks without hindrance.

Thirdly, a clearly defined manual for the role of operations staff during combat scenarios must be outlined. Having too many bodies in one place makes working extremely difficult, especially in high-pressure environments like Engineering. Only a limited number of Operations personnel should move to Engineering to assist with staffing; likewise with Security. Typically these would be persons that have the highest amount of skill or level of training in those particular areas. The rest should either: Proceed to Lower Decks and man critical system control rooms, alongside any other personnel assigned there, or work on Damage Control teams, co-ordinated by the Bridge, in conjunction with Damage Control on Deck 14.

Finally, on the subject of Damage Control, only assigning a single member of staff to the control room was a grave error, and will subsequently be remedied in any successive combat instance. In addition to this, placing a security cross trained member of the department inside, or close to the centre will go a long way to helping keep the area secure, given it’s critical nature to the well being of the ship.

With these recommendation, departmental readiness and performance will no doubt see an improvement, hopefully benefiting the continued success of the Atlantis in the Par'tha Expanse.

Engineering Report



Security Report



Medical Report



Marine Report



Summary

Notable SIMs


REV SD 239705.10